Senior lawyers have expressed sharply contrasting opinions after the Federal High Court in Abuja convicted Indigenous People of Biafra leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, and sentenced him to life imprisonment on terrorism charges—bringing an end to one of Nigeria’s most dramatic and divisive criminal trials.
His trial, which lasted 10 years, moved from judge to judge and was marked by arrests, releases, flight from the country, extradition disputes, courtroom disruptions, political tension and nationwide attention at every stage.
Justice James Omotosho delivered the final judgment with unusual speed—typed, endorsed and handed to both parties within 24 hours—and the ruling immediately ignited intense debate about its fairness, process and implications for federalism, national security and justice.
While some analysts believe the court simply applied the law to the facts, others insist the judgment lacks a solid legal foundation. Four senior lawyers spoke on the development, revealing deep divisions among legal experts.
Judge Went the Extra Mile for Fair Hearing — Edun, SAN
Wale Edun, SAN, considers the outcome expected, saying no recent judge gave a defendant more room to defend himself. The former NBA Welfare Secretary described the decade-long matter as a “10-year legal odyssey that tested the endurance of Nigeria’s judicial machinery.”
He praised Justice Omotosho’s “dexterity and probity,” adding: “The case took 10 years to conclude after going around several judges until it was transferred to the Court of Justice J.K. Omotosho. The trial judge granted an accelerated hearing and concluded the case in less than a year. I commend the case-management style and judicial probity of the court.”
For him, fairness was the core theme. “The prosecution witnesses were cross-examined. Defence counsel—led initially by the eminent silk, Kanu Agabi—had every opportunity. After the defence chose to terminate counsel’s services, the judge adjourned several times for the defendant to rethink his desire to represent himself.”
He noted that the court even tried to reduce the risks of self-representation: “The judge offered to deploy counsel from the Legal Aid Council, but the defendant rejected it. The court practically pleaded with him to open his defence. No reasonable person who followed the proceedings can say he was not given a fair chance.”
Edun explained the implication of refusing to defend oneself: “It is settled law that where a defendant fails to open his defence, he is deemed to have rested his case on the prosecution. It is a dangerous strategy. Justice is a three-way traffic: the defendant, the prosecution and the public.”
He argued that politics cannot guide judicial decisions: “A trial judge is never concerned about the politics of the case. His only duty is to determine whether the prosecution has proved the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Period!”
However, he urged federal authorities to consider reconciliation. “This does not detract from the Prerogative of Mercy Committee’s power to recommend a pardon. Convicted looters have been pardoned. We need healing now.”
He described Kanu’s trial as part of a wider national issue rooted in structural imbalance and poor leadership. “Nigeria is a federation of more than 300 tribes. We still operate a quota system and federal character 65 years after independence. These policies have replaced merit with mediocrity.”
Edun also warned against violent agitation: “No government will allow violence or threats that can cause breakdown of law and order. Look at Libya, Sudan, and Syria. Nigeria cannot afford security collapse.”
He recommended devolution of power, stronger governors and state police. “Nigeria is too big to be controlled from Abuja. The people must agitate through their leaders for devolution. Governors must stop worshipping Abuja. Nigerians must stop electing jokers. State Police is a must.”
Kanu Should Never Have Defended Himself — Opara, SAN
Victor Opara, SAN, adopted a middle position. He did not dismiss the judgment outright but questioned the procedure—especially Kanu’s decision to dismiss his lawyers and represent himself.
“Terrorism cases require high evidential thresholds and expert defence,” he said. “What surprised me was that Kanu dismissed a very competent legal team, in my view, and chose to defend himself. Defending yourself in a criminal trial requires forensic skill, emotional intelligence, and deep legal knowledge.”
He continued: “Unfortunately, we did not see him present witnesses or counter the prosecution’s evidence. When that happens, the judge has little room—if the prosecution’s evidence is unchallenged, it stands.”
Opara argued that the law forbids self-representation in such cases. “A defendant facing an offence that carries life imprisonment or death should never defend himself. Section 349 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, especially subsection (6), clearly states that a defendant facing a capital offence shall not defend himself.”
He said the judge should have assigned counsel: “Once his lawyers withdrew, he had no representation, and in my view, the judge should have assigned counsel from Legal Aid, the Ministry of Justice, or even the Nigerian Bar Association.”
He noted that the legal obligation is mandatory. “The law states that a defendant facing capital charges shall not be allowed to represent himself. It is a mandatory duty imposed by law, not a discretionary matter.”
But even if counsel is assigned, Opara said another issue emerges: “Does his constitutional right to counsel of his choice override that provision? These are issues for the appellate court.”
He added that the case was not hopeless: “From what I saw, Kanu’s case was not hopeless. There were many possible defences. I would have preferred that his very experienced lawyers handled the case using their forensic skills.”
On appeal, he was cautious: “Does he stand a chance on appeal? It depends on the grounds. The Court of Appeal is not a charity home. If he has solid grounds, the court will consider them.”
Judgment Built on Nothing Cannot Stand — Ufeli
Human-rights lawyer Evans Ufeli issued the strongest criticism, calling the judgment legally defective for three reasons: absence of a valid law, weak evidence and procedural errors.
He began with the alleged statutory defect. “The first and most elemental objection is statutory. Criminal law proceeds on the maxim: nullum crimen sine lege; no crime without law… ex nihilo nihil fit, ‘nothing comes from nothing.’ A conviction cannot validly derive from a legal vacuum.”
He said if the Terrorism Act used in the case was repealed before or during the trial, then the court had no legal foundation. “Absent that predicate, there is no correctly defined offence to try, no statutory elements to prove, and no lawful sanction to impose.”
He stressed that the court must determine the status of the law before trial. “If a court ignores or misapprehends that statutory question, any conviction it pronounces risks being void for want of a legal foundation.”
On evidence, he said: “No weapon was tendered. There was no direct proof tying him to violent acts. Allegations of terrorism require concrete links to acts of violence.”
He added: “Uncorroborated assertions or reliance on dangerous speeches without nexus to violent acts cannot meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Finally, he criticised the alleged refusal to hear a jurisdictional objection. “Jurisdiction goes to the very heart of adjudication. If a court ignores a valid objection to jurisdiction, everything it does afterwards is a nullity.”
He warned that the ruling is vulnerable: “Taken together—absent statutory foundation, insufficient proof, and failure to entertain jurisdictional objection—the conviction is constitutionally and legally defective.”
On appeal, he said: “In such circumstances, the conviction should be set aside or remitted for fresh trial after resolving the threshold issues.”
He said the consequences extend beyond Kanu. “If courts allow convictions where the statutory basis is doubtful or the evidential threshold is unmet, they erode criminal protections. No conviction should be built on nothing.”
It Was a Compromised Sentence — Ojo
Public law expert Gbenga Ojo described the outcome as a “policy judgment—compromised but necessary.”
He argued that terrorism offences ordinarily attract the death penalty, and the sentence appeared to be a balancing act. “It seems like a policy judgment. The penalty for treason or treason-related offences is death. The idea is to work out political solutions—like the prerogative of mercy—and release him after.”
Ojo said convicting Kanu was important to avoid encouraging future separatist agitation. “If Kanu had been released without a full trial, that would have been a very bad example. It would embolden other separatists to think trials can always be compromised.”
He supported a mix of firmness and reconciliation. “Let the judiciary do its work. Any similar offenders will go through the rigours of trial and punishment. But the government should temper justice with mercy and work out political solutions with stakeholders among Igbo leaders.”
Ojo described the outcome as “a welcome development,” saying it protects judicial integrity while keeping political dialogue open.
